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Recent Developments in English Law Affecting
International Transactions
The purpose of the present article is to examine three specific develop-
ments in English law which affect international transactions and primarily
those of a commercial nature. These are:
- the Mareva injunction
- judgments in foreign currencies
- international aspects of the Arbitration Act, 1979.
The Mareva Injunction
Orders for pre-judgment attachment of assets to prevent the removal by
defendants of assets from the jurisdiction and to secure any subsequent
judgment are common in the United States and in Continental European
countries. Since 1975 only, there has become available in England a similar
remedy by way of relief in personam. Up to that time it had not been the
practice of the English courts to seize assets of a defendant in advance of
judgment or to restrain the disposal of them.
The basis, however, for such remedy had existed for over 100 years since
this is to be found in section 45 of the Supreme Court of Judicature (Con-
solidation) Act, 1925 repeating Section 25(8) of the Judicature Act, 1873.
Section 45 states:
A mandamus or an injunction may be granted or a receiver appointed by an
interlocutory Order of the Court in all cases in which it shall appear to the Court
to be just or convenient. ...
This Section was relied upon by the Court of Appeal in May 1975 when
the Court determined that the traditional practice should be reviewed.'
*Mr. Brandon is a member of the English Bar who practices English law from Commugny,
Switzerland.
'Nippon Yuson Kaisha v. Karageorgis and another, 3 All E.R. 282 (1975).
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This decision was followed by the Court of Appeal in June 1975 in the case
of Mareva Compania Naviera S.A. v. International Bulkcarriers S.A.-The
Mareva.2 This case gave its name to what has now become the established
doctrine of the Mareva injunction. The Mareva concerned a time charter-
party governed by English law. An action was brought in England by for-
eign 3 shipowners for the nonpayment of hire. The foreign charterers could
not pay and were insolvent outside the jurisdiction of the English courts.
They had, however, moneys in a bank in London. The shipowners were
granted an injunction restraining the charterers from removing or disposing
out of the jurisdiction such moneys until judgment was given in the action
on the merits.
The decision in The Mareva has been followed, developed and restricted.
The Mareva doctrine has grown up in the Commercial Court and has been
particularly applied in relation to shipping matters. But it is not limited to
such matters and is now a general doctrine. It is based upon the need to
prevent judgments from being made ineffective by the removal from the
jurisdiction of defendants' assets. As was stated in Barclay-Johnson v.
Yuill:4
The heart and core of the Mareva injunction is the risk of the defendant remov-
ing his assets from the jurisdiction and so stultifying any judgment given by the
Courts in the action. If there is no real risk of this, such an injunction should be
refused; if there is a real risk, then if the other requirements are satisfied the
injunction ought to be granted.
The "other requirements" which a plaintiff must satisfy may now be
examined.
The injunction must be ancillary to a substantive cause of action justicia-
ble in England or enforceable by arbitration5 in England. Thus, the House
of Lords in The Siskina6 restricted the application of the doctrine. In that
case, the plaintiffs were owners of a cargo aboard a vessel owned by a Pana-
manian company, managed from Greece, which had become a total loss.
The latter company was paid insurance money in London and this was its
only asset. Consequently, the plaintiffs' sole hope of compensation was to
execute judgment against such money although they only had a substantive
cause of action, for other reasons, in Italy or Cyprus. A Mareva injunction
was refused on the ground that the cargo owners had no legal or equitable
right or interest in the insurance money which was enforceable in England
by means of a final judgment. The House of Lords held that a substantive
cause of action triable in England was essential to support a Mareva injunc-
tion unless the injunction was part of the substantive relief sought.
22 Lloyd's Rep. 509 (1975) and 1 All E.R. 213 (1980).
'The terms "foreign" and "foreigner" have been used throughout this Article for conven-
ience sake to denote a person who is not English.
43 All E.R. 190 at 194 (1980).
'See The Rena K, I Lloyd's Rep. 545 (1978).
63 All E.R. 803 (1977).
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In addition on this point, "the plaintiff must establish his claim with suffi-
cient particularity, and show a good arguable case, though he need not
demonstrate that his case is strong enough to entitle him" to summary
judgment.7
Thus, a Mareva injunction was refused by the Court of Appeal in Etablis-
sement Esejka International Anstalt v. Central Bank of Nigeria8 where a
Liechtenstein company brought an action against the defendant Nigerian
bank claiming the sterling equivalent of $4.5 million being payment due
under a letter of credit opened by the bank in favor of the company in
respect of cement shipments to Nigeria. The company also claimed dam-
ages for breach of the terms of the credit. By defence and counterclaim the
bank alleged that payments had already been made under the credit against
documents which were false and/or forged. The plaintiff was granted an
interim injunction directing the bank to retain the sum of $5 million within
the jurisdiction but this injunction was vacated on appeal on the ground
that a Mareva injunction could only operate where the plaintiff had a good
arguable case that the money concerned would become due to him. In the
present case, there was strong evidence of the presentation of forged docu-
ments and the possibility of a right to an equitable set-off.
Then there must be assets of some kind within the jurisdiction. In The
Mareva there was a bank account. However, in The Pertamina the Court of
Appeal held that the discretion to grant a Mareva injunction "was not lim-
ited to money; it also extended to goods within the jurisdiction although
particular care was to be taken in granting an injunction restraining
removal of goods where the grant of the injunction would be likely to bring
the defendant's business to a standstill or to inflict great loss on him that
might not be fully compensated by the plaintiffs undertaking in damages."9
Then it was held in Third Chandris Shipping Corporation and others v.
Unimarina SA. that "the existence of a bank account, even if it was an
overdraft, was evidence of assets within the jurisdiction, since it was to be
presumed that a large overdraft by a commercial undertaking would be
secured by a collateral security representing substantial assets."' 10
There is also the type of asset to be considered, as was stated in Barclay-
Johnson v. Yuill: "if, as in many of the reported cases, there is merely an
isolated asset here, the harm to the defendant may be small. On the other
hand, if he is trading here and the injunction would 'freeze' his bank
account, the injury may be grave. '' l
The Mareva and most other cases have concerned foreigners. But the
mere fact that a defendant is a foreign corporation does not in itself justify
73 All E.R. 190 at 195 (1980); see also Rasu Maritime SA v. Perusahaan Pertambangan
Minyak Dan Gas Bumi Negara (The Pertamina), 3 All E.R. 324 (1977).
'1 Lloyd's Rep. 445 (1979).
9See The Pertamina, supra note 7 at 325.
102 All E.R. 972 at 973 (1979).
"See supra, note 4 at 195.
632 INTERNATIONAL LAWYER
the granting of a Mareva injunction.' 2 There is no need for the defendant
to be a foreigner or a foreign-based person. The injunction can be applied
against the assets of a resident of England also. ' 3 In this respect, it is perti-
nent to note that the abolition of U.K. exchange controls has facilitated the
transfers of assets outside the jurisdiction of the English Courts by U.K.
residents.
A plaintiff must show a real risk of the defendant's assets being removed
from the jurisdiction. Matters of domicile, nationality, residence and the
like are relevant in applications for a Mareva injunction and any or all of
these elements may be important insofar as they relate to the risk of the
removal of assets from the jurisdiction. 14
A risk of removal is in itself not enough. There must also be a danger of
default if the assets of the defendant are removed from the jurisdiction.
Thus, although there may be considerable risk of removal, an injunction
will not be forthcoming unless there is also a danger of default.
In this connection it should be noted that the injunction will not merely
prevent the defendant from removing assets from the jurisdiction but also
restrain him from disposing of them even within the jurisdiction since
otherwise he might transfer them to a third party who would then remove
them from the jurisdiction.
Certain limitations may now be considered upon the granting of a
Mareva injunction.' 5 An overall view of the extent of the scope' 6 of a
Mareva injunction is illustrated by the decision of the Court of Appeal in
Cretanor Maritime Company Limited v. Irish Marine Management Lim-
ited.'7 In that case the owners of a vessel chartered it to charterers, both
being foreign companies. The charterers executed a debenture in favor of
an Irish bank charging their undertaking and property as security for
money due or to become due to the bank. The guarantee which was guar-
anteed by a guarantor provided that it should rank as a first charge on the
charterers' property and be a floating security, that the charterers should
not be at liberty to create any charge in priority to the debenture, that a
receiver appointed under the debenture should have power to take posses-
sion, collect and get in the property charged and for that purpose take pro-
ceedings in the charterers' name and that the receiver should be deemed to
be the charterers' agent. Disputes arose under the charter party which were
referred to arbitration and the owners were given judgment which
remained unsatisfied. The debenture was assigned to the guarantor after he
'
2See the Third Chandris, supra note 10 at 973.
3See supra, note 4. This will be so, even where the presence in England of a person is
temporary and he is likely to leave at short notice; see Chartered Bank v. Daklonche, I All
E.R. 205 (1980).
4See supra, note 4 at 195.
' 
5 d.
""Guidelines" were laid down by Lord Denning in the Third Chandris case, supra, note 10
at 984.
"3 All E.R. 164 (1978).
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had honored his guarantee and he appointed a receiver to collect and get in
the charterers' assets. The latter's only asset was a deposit with a London
bank. The owners obtained a Mareva injunction restraining the charterers
from removing the deposit from the jurisdiction. The receiver then applied
for a discharge of the injunction.
It was held that the receiver was not entitled to such discharge because as
the charterers' agent he could only get in their assets subject to any third
party rights therein created before his appointment and subject also to any
limitation on the charterers' power to deal with the assets which existed at
the date of appointment. As the charterers were at such date restrained by
the injunction the receiver as their agent was also bound thereby. However,
the debenture holder was entitled to apply for a'discharge of the injunction
so that the deposit could be removed from the jurisdiction because a
Mareva injunction did not operate as a pre-trial attachment of the assets
involved and therefore did not effect a seizure of an asset since even where
the injunction related to specific assets it was relief in personam and merely
restrained the defendant personally from dealing with the assets in a partic-
ular manner. Therefore in this case the Mareva injunction did not confer
on the owners any right in the deposit analogous to a lien and they did not
have priority over the debenture holder's rights arising on the appointment
of the receiver.
Another limiting factor relating to a Mareva injunction is that it is subject
to variation. Thus, it was held in Iraqui Ministry of Defence and others v.
Arcepey Shpping Company S.A.-The Angel Bell'8 that:
Although the whole point of the Mareva jurisdiction was to enable the plaintiff to
proceed by stealth as to pre-empt any option by the defendant to remove his
assets from the jurisdiction whether by his own act or by a transfer to a collabora-
tor within the jurisdiction, and to achieve that result a Mareva injunction was
necessarily in a wide form, it did not follow that, having granted such an injunc-
tion, the courts should not thereafter permit a qualification to it, to allow transfer
of assets by the defendant if the money was required for a purpose which did not
conflict with the policy underlying the Mareva jurisdiction.
It is clear that a very useful practice has been introduced into English
legal procedure by the Mareva injunction. It is also apparent that the doc-
trine is still evolving.
Judgments in Foreign Currencies
Until recently English judgments and English arbitration awards had to
be made in sterling, the relevent date for conversion into sterling being the
date when the cause of action arose. This was satisfactory when sterling
was stable and exchange rates were fixed. The rule was first changed in
1975 by the House of Lords holding that an English Court may give a for-
"'l All E.R. 480 at 481 (1980).
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eign currency judgment. The new rule has since been extended and most
cases have involved Swiss francs.
The landmark judgment was Miliangos v. George Frank (Textiles) Lim-
ited.19 In that case the Swiss plaintiff sold to English defendants textile
goods under a contract governed by Swiss law with the money of account
and payment being expressed in Swiss francs. The goods were delivered in
1971 but payment was not made. Since between the date when payment
should have been made and the date of the hearing sterling had fallen
against the Swiss franc, the Swiss franc contract price was equivalent to a
much larger sterling sum than it had been in 1971. The Swiss plaintiff
claimed the amount due to him in Swiss francs.
The House of Lords gave judgment for the plaintiff holding that when an
action for a sum of money due under a contract was brought the plaintiff
was entitled to obtain judgment for the amount of the debt in the foreign
currency if the contract was governed by the law of the country of that
currency and the money of account and payment was also of the same
country. If it became necessary to enforce the judgment in England the
amount was to be converted into sterling at the date when the Court author-
ized enforcement.
The Miliangos decision was limited to cases involving foreign money
obligations. Subsequently in Kraut v. Albany Fabrics Limited20 it was held
that a foreign currency judgment could be given on a claim for damages for
breach of contract. There the plaintiff was entitled to judgment in Swiss
francs for breach of a contract whose proper law was Swiss with the money
of account and payment also being in Swiss francs.
Then in Barclays Bank International Limited v. Levin Bros (Bradford)
Limited,2 1 a case which concerned bills of exchange expressed in U.S. dol-
lars but where the proper law of the contract was English, judgment was
given in dollars or the equivalent in sterling at the date of payment under
the contract or at the date of enforcement of the judgment.
In October 1978, the House of Lords extended the Miliangos rule to
claims in tort and confirmed lower court decisions that it covered breach of
contract also, in two cases involving charterparties. In The Despina R 22 the
ship of the plaintiff shipowners was damaged off Shanghai. Expenses were
incurred in Chinese currency, Japanese yen, U.S. dollars and sterling. The
House of Lords held that the plaintiffs damages were to be measured in the
currency in which he generally operated or with which he had the closest
connection. In this case it was U.S. dollars. But had the plaintiff not been
able to prove that this was the currency in which the loss was actually felt
then the damage should be measured in the currency in which it immedi-
ately arose.
193 All E.R. 801 (1975).
23 W.L.R. 872 (1976).
213 All E.R. 900 (1976).
221 All E.R. 421 (1979).
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In the other case The Folias23 French charterers chartered a ship from
Swedish owners to carry a cargo from Spain to Brazil under a charterparty
with a London arbitration clause and English law as the proper law. The
cargo arrived in Brazil in a damaged condition and the charterers who con-
ducted their business in French francs settled the cargo receivers' claim in
Brazilian cruzeiros purchased with French francs and then claimed the
amount of French francs expended from the Swedish owners. The House
of Lords decided that damages for breach of contract should be awarded in
the currency of the contract but where there was no such currency then
damages should be awarded in the currency which most truly expressed the
plaintiff's loss. In this case since the charterers' actual loss was the amount
of the French francs expended this was the correct currency.
In Federal Commerce & Navigation Company Limited v. Tradax Export
SA. 24 which concerned a claim by ship owners for demurrage in sterling
the proper law of the charter was English law but demurrage was payable
in U.S. dollars. The Court of Appeal gave judgment in U.S. dollars stating:
Once it is recognized that judgment can be given in a foreign currency justice
requires that it should be given in every case where the currency of a contract is a
foreign currency; otherwise one side or the other will suffer unfairly by the fluctu-
ations of the exchange. 25
The next point concerns what is the governing date for determining the
rate of exchange where there are various alternatives. This was dealt with
by the Court of Appeal in George Veflings Rederi.l/S v. President of India26
which case and two similar ones were concerned with demurrage incurred
when ships were delayed in discharging their cargoes. In each case the
charterparty was governed by English law and freight was to be paid in
external sterling at the exchange rate ruling on bill of lading date.
The demurrage was to be calculated in U.S. dollars. It was therefore held
that the money was payable in that currency. The question at issue was
whether the conversion rate into sterling should be taken at the date of the
bill of lading when sterling was at $2.39, the date on which demurrage
became due when sterling was $2.33 or the date on which payment was
made when sterling was $2.02. The Court held that the latter was the perti-
nent date and that the shipowners were entitled to the difference between
the sum already paid in sterling, which at the rate of exchange at the bill of
lading date was the then equivalent of the demurrage due in dollars, and
the sum required to be paid at the exchange rate applicable at the payment
date and to have this balance in dollars.
The most recent reported case in this series is Choice Investments Ltd v.
Jeromnimon (Midland Bank Ltd garnishee)27 which was decided by the
23Id.
242 All E.R. 41 (1977).
"Id. at 5 1.
1 All E.R. 380 (1979).271 All E.R. 225 (1981).
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Court of Appeal in November 1980. There an English resident owed a sum
in sterling to an English company. The latter obtained a garnishee order
nisi against the debtor's English bank accounts, one of which was in dollars.
The question which arose was whether the sum in the dollar account stand-
ing to the credit of the judgment debtor was a "debt" for the purposes of the
Administration of Justice Act, 1956, and was attachable accordingly in gar-
nishee proceedings notwithstanding that the judgment had been given in
sterling.
The Court of Appeal had no difficulty in holding that a "debt" covers
sums payable in England in a foreign currency. As the Court noted:
"Otherwise a debtor who owes to his creditor a debt payable in sterling but
who has a credit in sterling at his bank could always avoid execution by the
simple device of changing his credit at the bank out of sterling into a for-
eign currency."'28
The Court added:
The principles invoked in this case will require adaptation to meet other cases.
For instance, the judgment creditor may have a judgment in Swiss francs, and
then find that his debtor has a credit at the bank in U.S. dollars. I see no reason
why a garnishee order nisi should not be made to attach so many U.S. dollars as
would be needed to meet the judgment. Adaptation may be needed to be made
when the debtor has a sum owing to him by a shipping company or an insurance
company, and not by a bank.29
English law has developed in these currency cases to meet commercial
realities and the old certain rule has given way to one where the answer will
depend upon the circumstances of each case.
International Aspects of the Arbitration Act, 1979
The main purpose of the Arbitration Act, 197930 was to reform the law in
two important respects, with the Arbitration Act, 1950 continuing to be the
main legislation governing arbitration. The reforms concerned the substitu-
tion of a new judicial review procedure for the stated-case system and pro-
visions for contracting out of the new review procedure particularly for
international arbitrations. These changes were made because important
international arbitrations were not being directed towards England as
stated by the Hon. Mr. Justice Kerr:
The main reason for this has been the existence of the so-called special case pro-
cedure whereby our courts were able to exercise almost total control over arbitra-
tions on issues of law, and whereby awards could be prevented from becoming
final until all means of appeal to the courts had been exhausted. The parties and
their legal advisers concerned with non-standard international contracts, as well
as international arbitral organisations such as the ICC, have been understandably
reluctant to arbitrate in England and thereby to run a very high degree of risk
281d. at 228.
191d. at 229.
"The text of the Act is published in 18 INT'L LEGAL MATS. 1249 (1979).
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that our courts and not the chosen tribunal would have the final word.
3 1
With regard to the first reform, section 1 of the Act of 1979 abolished
both types of special case, namely, that stating an award and that stating a
question of law arising in the course of a reference. It also abolished the
High Court's jurisdiction to set aside or remit an award on the ground of
errors of fact or law on the face of the award.
Now, under section 1 (3) an appeal against an award requires either the
consent of all the parties or the leave of the Court and this will not be
granted unless the Court considers that "the determination of the question
of law concerned could substantially affect the rights of one or more of the
parties." Leave may also be made conditional so that an applicant might be
required to pay the whole or part of a claim into Court or to provide secur-
ity for the amount of the award.
On the determination of an appeal the High Court may either:
a) confirm, vary or set aside the award; or
b) remit the award to the reconsideration of the arbitrator together with
the court's opinion on the question of law. In this event, the arbitra-
tor, unless otherwise directed, must make his award within three
months.
Further possible appeal is very restricted.
Under section 2 of the Act the High Court may determine any question
of law arising in the course of the reference on an application by any of the
parties with the consent of either the arbitrator or of all the other parties.
However, the High Court must be satisfied not only that the question of law
could substantially affect the rights of one or more of the parties but also
that the determination of the application might produce substantial savings
in costs to the parties. Appeals to the Court of Appea 3 2 are limited in the
same manner as under section 1.
Sections 3 and 4 of the Act provide for the contracting out of the new
judicial review procedure by means of an "exclusion agreement" which is
one which excludes the right of appeal against an award under section 1
and/or the right of an application to the High Court for the determination
of a point of law under section 2, and may have been entered into either
before or after the Act entered into force on 1 August 1979 and may or may
not form part of an arbitration agreement. The effect of an exclusion agree-
ment will depend upon the type of arbitration involved.
In a "domestic arbitration agreement" an exclusion agreement is only
effective if entered into after the arbitration has begun. Section 3 (7) of the
Act defines a "domestic arbitration agreement" as follows:
3 Kerr, InternationalArbiration v. Litigation, J. Bus. L. 164 at 178 (May 1980).
2In Pioneer Shipping Ltd. and Another v. B.T.P. Tioxide Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 326 (1980), which
is believed to be the first case under section 1 of the Act, the Court of Appeal was seized of the
matter on two occasions. This would seem to run contrary to the overall purpose of the enact-
ment of the reforming legislation.
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An arbitration agreement which does not provide, expressly or by implication, for
arbitration in a State other than the United Kingdom and to which neither-
a) an individual who is a national of, or habitually resident in, any State other
than the United Kingdom, nor
b) a body corporate which is incorporated in, or whose central management
and control is exercised in, any State other than the United Kingdom,
is a party at the time the arbitration agreement is entered into.
Non-domestic arbitrations are divided into two types. Firstly, where the
award or the question of law arising in the course of the reference relates in
whole or in part to:
a) a question or claim falling within the Admiralty jurisdiction of the High
Court, or
b) a dispute arising out of a contract of insurance, or
c) a dispute arising out of a "commodity contract."
With respect to arbitration falling within one of the abovementioned cat-
egories an exclusion agreement will be effective if it is entered into after the
arbitration has commenced or if the award or the question of law relates to
a contract which is expressed to be governed by a law other than that of
England and Wales.
Section 4 (3) of the Act allows for the future abolition by subordinate
legislation of these special categories of arbitrations, wholly or in part or
subject to conditions.
The second type of non-domestic arbitrations are those which fall outside
the abovementioned special categories. These will normally concern inter-
national arbitrations arising under non-standard agreements involving
large sums of money to which States and/or State-owned agencies are par-
ties. An exclusion agreement in relation to such arbitrations is effective to
exclude both appeals against an award and applications to the High Court
to determine questions of law.
In relation to both types of non-domestic arbitrations the jurisdiction of
the High Court under section 24 (2) of the Act of 1950 to decide questions
of fraud has been ousted except insofar as an exclusion agreement provides
otherwise.
As will have been seen, the avowed intent of the Act of 1979 is to pro-
mote the conducting of major international arbitrations not only in English
but also in England.33
"Cf the 5-4 decision of the U.S. Supreme Court in Scherk v. Alberto Culver Co., 417 U.S.
506, 94 S. Ct. 2449 (1974) upholding the validity in a "truly international agreement" of an
arbitration clause providing for the Rules of the International Chamber of Commerce and for
the law of the State of Illinois as the applicable law.
